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Abstract
We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational e¤ects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we
show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors’ expectations
about promisees’ expectations that the promise will be kept) leads to a signi…cant
change in promisor behavior. We provide clean evidence that a promisor’s aversion to
disappointing a promisee’s expectation leads her to keep her promise. We propose a
simple theory of lexicographic promise keeping that is supported by our results and
nests the …ndings of previous contributions as special cases.
Keywords: promises, expectations, beliefs, contracts
JEL Classi…cation: A13, C91, D03, C72, D64, K12.
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Introduction

To facilitate production and exchange over time, parties often make promises in order to
commit to a particular course of action. There are three main reasons why a party would
honor such an obligation. The …rst is the existence of a third party enforcement mechanism.1
A second reason stems from reputational concerns that arise when parties are concerned that
reneging on a promise might hurt their future payo¤s.2 A third reason, and the focus of the
present paper, is the moral force of promise keeping.3 A string of recent studies o¤ers
experimental evidence that promises, even if they come in the form of mere cheap talk,
considerably enhance subsequent levels of cooperation in experimental hold-up, trust, and
dictator games (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Vanberg
2008, Charness and Dufwenberg 2011).
While the practical relevance and e¤ectiveness of the moral force of promise keeping is
undisputed, there is a vigorous debate in economics, social psychology, philosophy, and law
about why people keep (or should keep) their promises in the absence of explicit contractual
and reputational concerns.4 A clear understanding of what drives the desire to keep one’s
promise is essential to harnessing the bene…cial e¤ects of promises in institutional design,
whether it be in the design of legal policy, regulatory regimes, contracts, or organizations.5
Two leading explanations for the moral force of promise keeping have been proposed.
Proponents of the expectation-based theory argue that promisors (senders of promises) keep
their word in order to avoid guilt when failing to meet the expectations the promise has
created in promisees (receivers of promises). A promisor is therefore more likely to keep
1

This is assumed in the economic literature on formal contracts beginning with Mirrlees (1976) and
Holmström (1979).
2
Such self-enforcing contracts have been studied extensively in the literature on relational contracting
(Macaulay 1963, Klein and Le- er 1981, Bull 1987, Kreps 1990, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Levin 2003).
3
Note that in law every legally enforceable contract can at least partially rely on the moral force of
promise keeping as a source of commitment. This is because the legal de…nition of a contract requires the
existence of a promise as one of its elements (Restatement 2d of Contracts §1).
4
Notable contributions to the broader literature on promise keeping in political sciences and social psychology include Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994), Sally (1995), and
Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007). In legal philosophy classic references include Fried (1981), Atiyah (1983), and
Scanlon (1998). For a recent contribution containing a survey of the previous literature, see Shi¤rin (2008).
5
Finan and Schechter (2012) show that the moral force of promise keeping exists outside the lab and
signi…cantly in‡uences political behavior. Even with secret balloting (and thus unobservable votes), promises
to vote for a particular candidate are perceived to be su¢ ciently strong for vote-buying “candidates to target
trustworthy voters who can be trusted to keep their promise”(p. 876). Eigen (2012) shows that reminding a
contracting party that when entering into a contract they have made a promise is an e¤ective way to assure
compliance.
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her promise if she believes that the promisee expects her to keep her promise.6 In contrast,
the commitment-based theory claims that promisors have a preference for keeping their word
independent of the expectations of promisees. Promisors therefore su¤er a cost from behaving
in a way that is inconsistent with what they have promised.7 The factors emphasized by
these explanations are not mutually exclusive in explaining why people keep their promises.
However, previous experimental research has either failed to disentangle these two motives
or has only documented support for the commitment-based theory while suggesting that
the expectation-based theory does not explain promise keeping. An implication of these
results would be that making promisees’expectations salient in contractual and institutional
design is not an e¤ective way to induce more promise keeping or ful…llment of contractual
obligations.
Using a novel design which exogenously varies expectations (while holding constant
whether somebody makes a promise) this paper is the …rst to …nd clean experimental support for the expectation-based account. We propose a simple theory of lexicographic promise
keeping in which a promisor is in‡uenced by her promisee’s expectation but only if these
expectations are supported by the promise made by the promisor. This theory is consistent
with our experimental results and nests the …ndings of previous contributions as special
cases.
We use a trust game where a dictator (trustee) can make a free-form promise to a recipient
(trustee) and the recipient can decide whether to trust the dictator and to remain in the
game. Our main innovation is introduce a move of nature after this opt-in decision which
determines the probability that it will be technically possible for the dictator to keep her
promise. Both parties learn at this point whether the game is played with a “reliable random
device” under which there is a high probability that the dictator will be able to keep her
promise or whether the game is played with an “unreliable random device,” under which
there is a low probability that the dictator will be able to keep her promise. In the next
step, another move of nature determines whether the dictator is able to perform or not.
While both parties know with which random device the game is played, only the dictator
6

Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) provide some suggestive experimental evidence in support of expectation-based theories.
7
Experimental evidence for the commitment-based explanation for promise keeping can be found in the
contributions of Braver (1995), Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004),
and Ismayilov and Potters (2012).
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but not the recipient learns about whether she is able to perform or not. Therefore, a dictator
who knows she is able to perform may face two kinds of recipients. Either the recipient has
high expectations as he has learned that the game is played with the reliable random device,
or, he has low expectations as he has learned that the game is played with the unreliable
random device. This design allows us to compare promise keeping rates among dictators who
are both able to keep their promises but hold di¤erent second-order beliefs (beliefs about
how much the receiver expects to receive), depending on whether the history of the game
leading up to the dictator’s decision reveals that it was likely (“reliable random device”) or
unlikely (“unreliable random device”) that the dictator would be able to perform.
Using a within-subject design that allows us to observe dictators under both reliability
settings, we show that the exogenous variation of the reliability of the random device with
which the game is played directly a¤ects the recipient’s …rst-order and the dictator’s secondorder expectations, and that these signi…cantly change the dictator’s decision to keep her
promise. Our …ndings provide clean evidence for an expectation-based explanation of promise
keeping: while the commitment created through promises between the two parties remains
constant, second-order expectations increase due to the increase of the reliability of the
random device which in turn induces an increase in promisors’performance rates.
Finally, with a simple structural model we recover subject-speci…c susceptibilities to guilt
aversion and characterize their distribution in the subject population. While slightly less
than half of our subjects are una¤ected by this behavioral trait, the remaining proportion
exhibits some degree of guilt aversion and there is signi…cant variation in how guilt-averse
these subjects are.
Related Literature Our paper builds on the large literature on promises in economics,
social psychology, philosophy, and law discussed in footnote 4. Methodologically, the paper
is most closely related to the contributions of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg
(2008), and Ellingsen et al (2010).
We show that promisees’ expectations play an important role when promisors decide
whether to keep their promises in a trust game. However, this is only the case when there
is a direct promissory link between the promisor and the promisee. In other words, dictator
A’s performance decision is only in‡uenced by recipient B’s expectations if A has made a
promise to B. Where such a promissory link is missing, either because dictator A has made a
4

promise to recipient C, or dictator A has not made a promise at all, we …nd that recipients’
expectations do not have a signi…cant impact on dictators’performance choices. Yet, these
latter cases without direct promissory links are exactly the scenarios considered in previous
studies.
Using an ingenious experimental design, Vanberg (2008) argues that commitment per
se is the only reason why people keep their promises. However, his suggestion that the
expectation-based theory does not explain promise keeping is based on the observation that
exogenous variation of second-order expectations does not lead to any statistically signi…cant
di¤erence in promise keeping in a setting where there is no direct promissory link: When
deciding whether to perform, a promisor is completely certain that she faces recipient B, and
no longer recipient C to whom she initially made a promise.8 Similarly, Ellingsen et al (2010)
…nd no signi…cant relationship between expectations and contributions in dictator/trust
games in which they elicit expectations from recipients and communicate those beliefs to
the dictator/trustee. Here too, a direct promissory link is missing because no promises
are ever made. In contrast, in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) there are direct promises
and the authors provide suggestive evidence in support of guilt aversion, but their evidence,
unlike ours, is based on correlations between second-order beliefs and actions that also admit
alternative explanations.
The central contribution of our paper is to use exogenous variation in second-order beliefs
and to show that the irrelevance of promisor expectations is a unique feature of the special
cases in which expectations are not supported by direct promises. Instead, promise keeping
seems to have a lexicographic structure: A promisee’s expectations matter if and only if
a direct promissory link exists between the promisor and the promisee.9 Our theory and
experiment can explain why guilt aversion plays a role in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
but appears irrelevant in Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen et al (2010). One reason for this
8

Vanberg (2008) also studies situations in which the promissory link is not broken, but second-order
expectations are not exogenously changed in that setting.
9
Note that common law seems to track our lexicographic account of promise keeping. Under the doctrine
of promissory estoppel, in the absence of an enforceable contract a disappointed party can recover against
another party only if the other party made a promise that led to detrimental reliance (see Restatement
(Second) of Contracts x90). More generally, across jurisdictions, law tends to protect reasonable expectations,
but only if the injured party actually expected performance and only if the other side was in some way
responsible for an act which created those expectations. By …nding that the structure of promise keeping
follows the same lexicographic structure, we …nd evidence consistent with a fundamental conjecture of legal
theory: Law tracks and serves as a backstop to our moral intuitions.
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lexicographic structure might be that a promise creates a sense of responsibility in the
promisor, maybe because a promise establishes a personal connection which increases the
salience of the promisee’s expectations or maybe because the promisor thinks that her act
of promising caused the promissee’s expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the design of the
experiment, a simple model of promises and guilt aversion, and the experimental procedures.
In Section 3 we report our results. Section 4 concludes. In Appendix A we report the exact
instructions for the subjects participating in our experiment. Appendix B contains the formal
proofs for our theoretical predictions.

2

Experimental Design and Procedure

We design an experiment to investigate the role of expectations in promise keeping. We
hypothesize that a dictator is more likely to keep her promise if she believes that the recipient
expects her to keep her promise. The underlying rationale for our hypothesis is that a dictator
cares about the recipient’s expectations if and only if those expectations are supported by
the dictator’s own promise.
Previous experiments were not intended to investigate this question, and hence they
either confounded expectation- and commitment-based explanations or used the expectations
created by other promisors as a means of varying the level of promisees’expectations. Thus,
our design is the …rst to shed light on what we refer to as the lexicographic structure of
promise keeping. Instead of varying second-order beliefs through the promises given by a
third party as in Vanberg (2008), the promissory link between the two parties is not broken in
our experiment. Rather, the magnitude of the dictator’s expectations is exogenously varied
by the type of random device that is selected.

2.1

Experimental Design

In our experiment, subjects are randomly matched in pairs in each period and play the
experimental trust game depicted in Figure 1. In that game, after receiving a free-form
message from the dictator, the recipient decides to opt in or out of the game and the dictator
subsequently decides how much to contribute to the recipient.10
10

This free-form message approach, which allows the dictator to send any message to the recipient (with the
exception of identifying information such as name, age, race, gender) follows previous research by Charness

6

Dictator
Free-form Message (m)

2,2

Recipient d ∈ {0,1}

Opt Out (d=0)

Opt In (d=1)
Nature

Reliable (ρ=5/6) or
Unreliable (ρ=1/6) Device
Nature

ρ ∈ {1/6,5/6}

1-ρ: Cannot Perform (A0)

θ ∈ {0,1}

14,0

ρ: Can Perform (A1)

14,0

Dictator

Don’
t Perform

¼ Perform
13,3

a ∈ A1

¾ Perform

½ Perform

11,9

12,6

Perform
10,12

Figure 1: Dictator game with opt-out choice and reliable/unreliable device
The main feature of our design is that, following the opt-out decision of the recipient,
nature selects whether the subjects play the game with a reliable or an unreliable device.
This device determines how likely it is that the dictator will be able to choose some positive
level of performance (i.e., any action other than Don’t Perform). If the random device is
reliable, the dictator can choose an action that delivers a positive payo¤ to the recipient
(Perform, 3/4 Perform, 1/2 Perform, 1/4 Perform) with probability 5=6. If the random
device is unreliable, the dictator can only deliver on a promise to perform with probability
1=6. For example, if performance is impossible, the dictator receives $14 and the recipient
receives $0. If performance is possible and the dictator chooses Perform, she receives $10 and
the recipient receives $12. Figure 1 depicts the remaining payo¤s for the two players. If the
dictator chooses Don’t Perform the parties receive the same payo¤s (14; 0) as if performance
had not been possible.
Formally speaking, the random device determines how likely it is that the dictator …nds
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008). In contrast, Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) use pre-coded
messages and …nd only small e¤ects of such ‘bare’promises.
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herself in one of two states of the world,

2 f0; 1g, with associated action space A . This

action space depends on whether the dictator is able to perform,
a2A =

A0 = f0g
if
A1 = f0; :25; :5; :75; 1g if

= 1, or not

= 0:

=0
:
=1

Figure 1 illustrates that the dictator’s monetary payo¤s can be written as a function of her
decision a by
by

R (a)

D

(a) = 14

4a. Similarly the recipient’s monetary payo¤s are represented

= 12a.

The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of each period (t = 0), subjects are
randomly paired and nature randomly determines the identity of the second mover (dictator,
promisor) and the …rst mover (recipient, promisee) in each pair. At t = 1 the dictator
can send a free-form message m that, following the literature on promises, is coded as no
message, empty talk, or promise,

(m) 2 f;; 0; 1g. Although we distinguish between the

di¤erent messages in our experimental data, for the purpose of our model, we will treat
no message and empty talk as the same category such that (m) 2 f0; 1g. At t = 2, the
recipient decides to opt out or to stay in, d 2 f0; 1g. If d = 0, the game ends and payo¤s
(2; 2) for the dictator and the recipient are realized. If d = 1, the game continues to t = 3.
At t = 3, nature determines the type of the random device

with which the game is played.

The random device can be either reliable ( = 5=6) or unreliable ( = 1=6) where

denotes

the probability that the dictator will be able to choose from action space A1 . Both parties
learn the type of the random device. At t = 4, the dictator but not the recipient learns the
state of the world

and she makes the decision a 2 A . Thus the dictator knows that she

can perform but, when making her choice, she faces recipients who plausibly expect a higher
payo¤ under the reliable than under the unreliable scenario. At t = 5, both players learn
their payo¤s, and the recipient learns the state .11
In addition to recording the dictator’s choice a at t = 4 in our experiment, we elicit the
recipient’s and the dictator’s beliefs at t = 3. The recipient is asked which action a 2 A1 the
dictator is going to choose if she will be able to perform at t = 4. Because the recipient knows
11

This design feature means that if the dictator chose not to perform although she was able to, the
recipient will know that the dictator broke her promise. The dictator cannot hide behind the circumstances.
Eliminating this deniability is important as a dictator would bene…t from a higher level of deniability in the
unreliable ( = 1=6) as opposed to the reliable ( = 5=6). As we explain later, our main design idea is to
use the two random devices to exogenously vary second-order expectations and it is important that we do
not introduce a confound by having the identity of the random device also in‡uence the level of deniability.
Tadelis (2011) theoretically and experimentally shows that the degree of exposure of the dictator’s actions
to the recipient’s scrutiny also in‡uences the dictator’s actions.
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with which random device
the game (realizations of
by
D

R

the game is played, these beliefs might depend on the history of
and ). We therefore denote the …rst-order belief of the recipient

( ; ) 2 [0; 1]. In turn, the dictator has a belief (probability measure) regarding

R.

Let

( ; ) 2 [0; 1] denote the mean second-order belief the dictator has about the recipient’s

belief

R(

; ), which we also elicit at t = 3.12 As we mention in our detailed description of

the experimental procedure, this elicitation of beliefs was incentivized.13 It is important to
note at t = 4 (i.e., at the time when the dictator makes her decision) the dictator— but not
the recipient— knows the state of

(i.e., whether the dictator can perform).

Except for the slightly richer action set for the dictator and a within-subject design, this
game is to a large extent identical to the trust/dictator game in Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) and Vanberg (2008).14 We chose a richer action space to allow for more variation
in the contribution rates of dictators as well as a within-subject design that asks dictators
to choose actions for both the reliable and unreliable device to increase statistical power.15
However, what really distinguishes our design from the previous two papers is the existence
of the random device, which determines the probability with which the dictator will be able
to choose some positive level of performance. The main purpose of this design innovation
is to exogenously vary the dictator’s and the recipient’s expectations without breaking any
promissory link that exists between a dictator and a receiver.16
If the random device is reliable, then there is a probability of

= 5=6 that the dictator will

be able to choose Perform. If, on the other hand, the random device is unreliable, there is only
a probability of

= 1=6 that the dictator will be able to choose Perform. Thus, recipients

12
Similar to the design in Vanberg (2008) the elicitation of the beliefs in our experiment restricts the set
of …rst- and second-order beliefs to a set of …ve elements that mirrors A1 .
13
The main bene…t of incentivizing beliefs is that it increases the accuracy of beliefs. As a downside, there
is evidence that eliciting beliefs and, in particular, incentivizing belief elicitation a¤ects contribution levels
in repeated public goods games, although the direction of the e¤ect seems very sensitive to design speci…cs
(e.g., Croson 2000, Gächter and Renner 2010). This does not pose a problem for our design, given that we
are only interested in the di¤erence between contribution levels between the reliable and unreliable scenario
which should cancel out any level e¤ects. We should be more concerned about an increased steepness between
beliefs and contributions as our design is based on manipulating second-order beliefs. However, there is only
weak evidence of a very small e¤ect of belief elicitation on the relationship between beliefs and contribution
rates (Gächter 2010).
14
Vanberg (2008) also uses euros rather than dollars, thus generating slightly higher payo¤s for the participants.
15
Brandts and Charness (2000) have shown that decisions elicited using the strategy method do not di¤er
signi…cantly from those elicited using the “hot” method.
16
As discussed before, in Vanberg (2008), recipient expectations are exogenously varied by using thirdparty promises, but this variation comes at the expense of a broken promissory link between the two parties.
In Ellingsen et al (2010) no promises are ever made to begin with.
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who are playing the game with an unreliable random device can plausibly expect lower
monetary payo¤s from the game. Because dictators are aware of this change in expectations
(due to independent variation in the experiment), their second-order expectations are also
exogenously changed. It is important to note that our manipulations cannot a¤ect the
commitment per se because at the time the promise is made, the dictator only knows that
the game is potentially played with the reliable or the unreliable random device, but not
which of the two scenarios will subsequently be realized. Similarly, at the time the dictator
makes her decision at t = 4, she— but not the recipient— knows whether she is able to
perform independent of which random device the game was played with. At this point,
only the history of the game di¤ers. If higher second-order expectations lead to higher
contribution rates by the dictators who promised to perform, this would constitute evidence
for the expectation-based explanation of promise keeping.17
To state our ideas more formally, we now present a simple model that builds on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg
2007, 2009) and captures the e¤ect of guilt aversion on promise keeping.

2.2

A Simple Model of Promises and Guilt Aversion

Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) propose two general theories of guilt aversion based on simple guilt and guilt from blame, respectively. Our model uses the former concept of simple guilt
in which the dictator cares about the extent to which she lets the recipient down.18 We de…ne
D

0 as a constant measuring the dictator’s sensitivity to guilt from disappointing the

recipient’s expectations, which the dictator expects to be equal to E [

Rj D ;

] = 12

D

( ).

We conjecture that promise keeping has a lexicographic structure. Recipients’expectations
only play a role if the dictator has made a promise ( = 1), but not if she has not made a
promise ( = 0) to the recipient.
The dictator’s utility UD when she chooses a at t = 4 can now be written in the following
17

It is important to remember that in t = 5 the recipient learns , that is, whether the dictator was able
to perform or not. See footnote 11.
18
A philosopher might object to this terminology as it comes close to depicting guilt aversion as a primary
moral motivation. It can only be a secondary one, activated by a person’s belief that some other fact itself
provides direct motivation to act. In this case, the prospect of disappointing expectations would be wrong
and therefore one should not do it.

10

way:
UD (a) =

D

= 14

(a)
4a

D

k
12k

(max fE [
D

k

Rj D

(max f

D

( ; ); ]

( ; )

R

(a) ; 0g)k

(1)

a; 0g)k :

The last term of the dictator’s utility function captures the impact of guilt. This term
only plays a role if the dictator sent a promise (
to guilt aversion (
E[

Rj D ;

D

= 1) and if the dictator is susceptible

> 0). Guilt from disappointing the recipient’s perceived expectations

] by choosing a low payo¤

R

(a) for the recipient has a negative e¤ect on utility,

but there is no gain from exceeding the recipient’s expectations. The dictator can reduce the
negative utility from guilt by increasing her action a up to the point where it matches the
dictator’s beliefs about the recipient’s expectations. In contrast to Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009), we allow guilt to be linear (k = 1) or
convex (k > 1) in the di¤erence between the dictator’s expectations, E [
realized payo¤s for the recipient,

R

Rj D ;

], and the

(a). For k = 1, our model nests the model of Charness

and Dufwenberg (2006) as a special case that only admits corner solutions of a. For k > 1,
interior solutions of a (i.e., a 6= f0; 1g) are also possible.19 Finally, and most importantly,
note the role of the random device. When the random device is reliable ( = 5=6), the
impact of guilt— by virtue of the larger expected payo¤ for the recipient— is much larger
than when the device is unreliable ( = 1=6).20
2.2.1

Predictions

It is instructive to establish two benchmark cases in which expectations do not a¤ect actions.
First, a dictator who is motivated solely by her own monetary payo¤ and is not sensitive to
guilt at all,

D

= 0, would have a utility of 14

4a and would therefore maximize her payo¤

by choosing a = 0.21 Second, in the settings considered by Vanberg (2008) and Ellingsen et al
(2010), in which no direct promissory link between the dictator and the recipient exists and
19

For ease of presentation we focus on the latter case in the main text. In the appendix, we show that our
results also hold for k = 1.
20
Our model draws on the theory of simple guilt aversion developed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)
who adapt the sequential equilibrium concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982) to psychological games. However,
for the most important part of our theoretical analysis (TP1 below), like Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
we do not invoke any equilibrium supposition.
21
Of course, there are many reasons other than guilt aversion such as social preferences or norms (Rabin
1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) that would predict
an equilibrium action a other than 0.
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thus

= 0, beliefs about expectations

D

( ) also do not matter and hence the predictions

are the same as in our …rst benchmark.
Thus, our model requires two assumptions for second-order beliefs to play a role in
promise keeping. There must exist a promise between the two parties,
dictator must experience some guilt aversion,

D

= 1, and the

> 0. Second-order expectations will then

generate di¤erent predictions about the contribution choice a for the reliable ( = 5=6) and
the unreliable ( = 1=6) device. The dictator’s utility is given by
UD = 14

4a

12k

D

(max f

D

( )

a; 0g)k

k
which yields di¤erent levels of guilt for the two di¤erent devices and where we write
1; ) =
for

D

(2)
D(

=

( ) for simplicity. It is straightforward to see that the impact of guilt is larger

= 5=6 than for

= 1=6 thus leading to a higher equilibrium action a for two reasons.

First, there is a di¤erence in actions resulting purely from the exogenous variation in the
reliability

of the device. Second, there is an additional (second-order) e¤ect resulting from

the impact of this exogenous variation on equilibrium beliefs

D.

The …rst-order condition

with respect to a for the dictator yields the following interior solution:
1

k 1
4
a = D( )
(3)
k
D 12
The dictator’s action a is increasing in the reliability of the random device, , the dictator’s

second-order belief,

D,

and her susceptibility to guilt aversion,

To see the …rst e¤ect of
same in both settings,

D.

on a, assume that second-order beliefs about actions are the

D (5=6)

=

D (1=6),

and that, just for ease of exposition, k = 1. As

can be seen from equation (2), the guilt experienced by the dictator when choosing a = 0
is 2
for

D D

for

= 1=6, which is much smaller in magnitude relative to the guilt experienced

= 5=6 where it is 10

D D.

This argument holds a fortiori for

D (5=6)

>

D (1=6)

as

is evident from the …rst-order condition for interior solutions of a from equation (3). Thus,
in equilibrium, we expect the dictator to choose higher levels of a for

= 5=6 than for

= 1=6.22 This leads us to the main hypothesis generated by our model.
Theoretical Prediction 1 If there is a promise ( = 1), the dictator’s contribution action
a is higher for the reliable than for the unreliable device. If there is no promise ( = 0),
there is no di¤erence in the dictator’s contribution action. (TP1)
22

See Appendix B for a more rigorous proof of the theoretical predictions taking the possibility of corner
solutions into account.
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As a result of these di¤erent action choices, we also expect …rst- and second-order beliefs
to di¤er in the two settings. In particular, because predicted actions are higher for

= 5=6,

equilibrium …rst-order beliefs of recipients must adjust to the di¤erent actions that the
dictator chooses in the two settings. Hence, …rst-order beliefs are higher,
and, as a result, equilibrium second-order beliefs must be higher too,

D

R

(5=6)

(5=6)

R
D

(1=6)

(1=6) if

0. This leads us to our second prediction.
Theoretical Prediction 2 If there is a promise ( = 1), …rst-order and second-order beliefs are higher for the reliable device than for the unreliable device. If there is no promise
( = 0), there is no di¤erence in …rst-order and second-order beliefs. (TP2)
At this point it is crucial to remind the reader that in contrast to the central prediction
about contribution actions (TP1) this prediction regarding beliefs (TP2) is a little more
subtle because it requires beliefs to adjust to the changes in actions postulated in TP1. That
is to say, in our model, any di¤erences in beliefs are caused by di¤erences in contribution
actions between the two random devices and message categories. If, however, in terms of
contribution actions dictators do not respond di¤erently to the random devices and messages
then beliefs will also be una¤ected. Note further that this di¤erence in second-order beliefs
provides a second reason for why actions are higher under

= 5=6 and reinforces the …rst

e¤ect on the dictator’s action discussed in TP1. Because the dictator’s action is higher
in equilibrium if there is a promise ( = 1) compared to when there is none ( = 0), the
recipient’s expected payo¤ from not opting out is higher if

= 1. Therefore, the recipient’s

opt-out decision and his beliefs should be responsive to the message of the dictator. This
leads us to our third hypothesis.
Theoretical Prediction 3 The recipient’s opt-in rate and …rst-order beliefs are higher if
there is a promise ( = 1) than if there is no promise ( = 0). (TP3)
Consistent with the results obtained by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg
(2008), we …nd that promises made in the communication phase are correlated with a significant increase in both the rate at which dictators choose an action other than Don’t Perform
and in the second-order beliefs concerning the probability that they will do so. However,
the primary goal of the present paper is to investigate whether independent variation in the
13

level of second-order beliefs, achieved through the use of a random device, leads to di¤erent
performance levels by dictators who previously made promises.23

2.3

Experimental Procedure

We conducted 20 experimental sessions with a total of 280 student subjects at the California
Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL). The CASSEL subject pool consists of
undergraduate students from UCLA. Subjects were assigned to visually isolated computer
terminals. Beside each terminal they found paper instructions, which are reproduced in
Appendix A. Questions were answered individually at the subjects’seats.
Each session consisted of 2 unpaid practice rounds followed by 8 paying rounds. In each
round, subjects interacted with another randomly chosen participant. Under no circumstances did any participant interact with the same participant twice in the paying rounds.
We achieved this by creating matching groups of exactly 10 subjects. At the end of the
experiment, one of the 8 paying rounds was randomly chosen for payment. Each round was
equally likely to be selected. The amount paid out at the end of the experiment depended
on the decisions made in that round. In each period we also elicited …rst- and second-order
beliefs of subjects about the behavior of other subjects. This elicitation of beliefs was incentivized and subjects were paid for all rounds except the one chosen for payment of the
decision to prevent hedging. The subjects received a …xed fee of $10 for arriving on time. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
First, each subject was randomly matched with an interaction partner, and one participant in each pair was randomly assigned to the role of a dictator or the role of a recipient.24
The pair matches and the roles of the players were randomly assigned anew in each round.
It was always equally likely to be assigned to either role, regardless of the previous messages
or actions in the game.
Second, each dictator could send free-form messages to the recipient. The dictator could
23

We do not (intend to) show that the fact of having made a promise causes performance rates to increase.
It might be that dictators who make a promise are just more likely to perform, independent of whether they
have made a promise or not. To rule out such a selection e¤ect, we would have to run a treatment in which
it is not possible to make a promise and compare the performance rates with those chosen in a treatment
where making a promise is possible. This is exactly the main manipulation in Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) who …nd evidence supporting a causal inference.
24
In the instructions, we neutrally refer to the role of the dictator and the role of the recipient as “Role
A” and “Role B,” respectively.
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send any number of (unidirectional) messages of a length of 256 characters each within a
time frame of 90 seconds.25 Subjects were not allowed to reveal their identity to the other
participant. That is, they were not allowed to reveal their name or any other identifying
feature such as race, gender, hair color, or seat number. In every other respect, subjects
were free to send any message they liked.
Third, after receiving the message of the dictators, the recipients could decide whether
to opt out. If a recipient chose to opt out, each player received $2. If a recipient chose not
to opt out, the game continued. At this point, neither player knew whether the random
device determining whether the dictator would be able to perform was Random Device 5/6
(“reliable random device”, probability of 5/6 that dictator would be able to choose something
other than Don’t Perform) or Random Device 1/6 (“unreliable random device”, probability
of 1/6 that dictator would be able to choose something other than Don’t Perform). However,
both parties knew that each scenario could occur with an equal probability of 50%.
Fourth, nature privately determined whether the players would play the game with the
reliable or the unreliable random device, which determined the probability with which the
dictator in the pair was able to choose a positive level of performance. At this point neither
player learned with which type of random device the game was played. The players only
learned at the end of each round which random device was chosen.
Fifth, the recipient guessed which choice the dictator would likely make if she could choose
to perform and the dictator guessed which payo¤ the recipient expected to earn. Speci…cally,
recipients and dictators were asked to choose from a …ve point scale. While the recipient’s
guessing payo¤ depended on the contribution decision of the dictator, the dictator’s guessing
payo¤ depended on the belief chosen by the recipient. Both payo¤s were higher the closer
they were to the actual contribution and belief, respectively.26 As both parties did not know
which random device had been chosen, we asked the players to make their guesses for both
reliability scenarios. Note that if a recipient thought that the dictator intended to choose
Perform (allocating $12) a recipient’s expected payo¤ depended on the reliability scenario.
The expected payo¤ was $2 if the game was played with Random Device 1/6 (12
and $10 if the game was played with Random Device 5/6 (12
25

1=6 = 2)

5=6 = 10). Asking the

Note that the 90-second time frame was not enforced, as it just served as an informal pacemaker.
With the exception of …ve (rather than two) potential choices for the contribution decision our belief
elicitation method is identical to that used in Vanberg (2008).
26
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dictator to make her guesses in terms of the recipient’s expected payo¤s allowed us to make
those expectations particularly salient. These procedures yielded …ve point scales between
0 (performance very unlikely) and 1 (performance very likely) for …rst- and second-order
beliefs.
Sixth, the dictator was asked to assume that she were able to perform and to make their
contribution decisions as if the game leading up to that point had been played with Random
Device 5/6 or Random Device 1/6. Figure 1 depicts the players’payo¤s under the di¤erent
possible contribution decisions.
Seventh, the computer randomly drew an equally likely integer between 1 and 6 for each
pair using z-Tree’s random number generator. If the random device was reliable it was
possible for the dictator to perform for the numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. If the random device
was unreliable, the dictator was able to perform for the number 1.
Finally, at the end of each round, both dictators and recipients learned with which random
device the game had been played, whether it had been possible for the dictators to perform,
and the payo¤s both participants had earned.

3

Results

The data comprise 20 experimental sessions involving a total of 280 subjects with a total of
28 matching groups of 10 subjects. Each session lasted for 8 rounds. The average number
of dictator decisions made by each subject is 4. As we used the strategy method to elicit
…rst- and second-order beliefs and contribution choices for both types of the random device,
this within-subject design gives us a total of 1,120 decisions made under each reliability
scenario. However, each matching group constitutes only one independent observation. Nonparametric tests are therefore based on matching group averages of the relevant variables.
For comparisons between the random devices, we have matched observations that allow us to
use two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests while for unmatched comparisons between message
categories we use two-tailed Mann-Whitney ranksum (MW) tests.27
27

For all the instances where the MW ranksum test is used, we also used the Fligner-Policello (FP) test.
This test is a robust rank test for unmatched data which does not require that the two populations that are
to be compared have equal variances (see Section 4.4 of Hollander et al (2014) for a complete description
of the FP test). In our analysis the p-values of each MW ranksum test and its corresponding FP test are
almost identical and we therefore omit reporting the results for the latter test.
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3.1

Performance Rates

To investigate the role of promises, we asked a student assistant to code messages according to
whether they contained a promise stating that the subject would choose any action other than
Don’t Perform. Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), this classi…cation yielded three
categories: “no message” ( = ;) containing no text at all; “empty talk” ( = 0) messages
(e.g., “Hey I just met you/and this is crazy/but here’s my message/so money maybe?”);
and “promise” ( = 1) messages (e.g., “im going to choose 3/4th perform so please dont
opt out”). After accounting for all opt-out decisions (see Section 3.4), there remain 383,
300, and 268 individual observations, and 28, 27, and 28 matching group observations in the
three message categories (promise, empty talk, no message) for both the reliable and the
unreliable device. We use these for our remaining analysis.
When the dictator made a promise ( = 1), the average contribution (performance rate)
she gave to the recipient was $7.08 (0.59) for the reliable ( = 5=6) and $6.48 (0.54) for
the unreliable device (

= 1=6), conditional on performance being feasible. While this

di¤erence is small in magnitude it is highly statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank,
p-value < 0.01) and consistent with our central hypothesis TP1. When the dictator made a
promise, she actually chose higher performance rates when it subsequently turned out that
it was likely that she would be able to perform (reliable device), as opposed to when the
possibility of performance was unlikely (unreliable device). Furthermore, as we show below,
the small magnitude of the contribution di¤erentials is in line with the small, but signi…cant
di¤erentials in second-order beliefs between the two random device settings, lending further
empirical support to the expectations-based explanation for promise keeping. Dictators
contributed signi…cantly more under the reliable device scenario because they (correctly) held
exogenously higher second-order beliefs about the recipients’expectations in that scenario.
As we are employing the strategy method (and thus a within-subject design), it is particularly instructive to examine the behavior of those dictators who made di¤erent contribution
decisions in the unreliable and the reliable device setting. Figure 2 shows the contribution
decisions of dictators who promised to contribute and who chose to alter their contribution
decision depending on whether the device was reliable or unreliable.28 A much lower proportion of dictators chose Don’t Perform for the reliable than for the unreliable device, and
28

Note that all of our statistical tests are based on the full sample of dictators and not just those dictators
who changed their decision between the two random devices.
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Figure 2: Fraction of performance decisions of dictators (Don’t Perform, 1/4 Perform, 1/2
Perform, 3/4 Perform, Perform) who sent a promise and changed their decision between
the unreliable and the reliable device
hence more of them ended up choosing higher performance rates. While 40% of dictators
chose Don’t Perform under the unreliable device, only less than 5% chose the same action under the reliable device. As a result, a much larger proportion of dictators chose to contribute
a positive amount under the reliable device, with the 3/4 Perform action experiencing the
largest increase.29
At this point, it is crucial to note that the signi…cant di¤erence in dictator contributions
between the two settings disappeared when the dictator engaged in empty talk (Wilcoxon
signed-rank, p-value 0.27) or sent no message at all (p-value 0.14). Thus, in the absence of
an explicit promise, higher reliability did not lead to higher performance. This …nding is the
empirical equivalent of the second part of TP1, which shows that contributions should not
di¤er between the two reliability settings if the dictator did not promise. This evidence is also
consistent with the conjectured lexicographic structure of promise keeping. The receiver’s
expectations in‡uence the dictator’s contribution decisions only when the dictator committed
herself to a promise; they play little or no role when the dictator made no promise.
29

Figure 2 also shows that many subjects make interior choices of a, suggesting that guilt aversion is not
linear (k = 1), but that it is instead convex (k > 1) in the di¤erence between beliefs and actions. We explore
the magnitude of guilt aversion in greater detail in Section 3.5.
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We want to stress that while our design provides crisp evidence for the central thesis
of our paper that recipients’ expectations matter for dictators’ performance decisions, our
results are only consistent with the conjectured lexicographic structure of promise keeping.
Our design is not ideally suited for directly testing this lexicographic structure. The fact
that expectations do not matter for those dictators who did not make a promise could be
due to a selection e¤ect: dictators who are more likely to promise are also more likely to be
a¤ected by di¤erences in recipients’expectations. However, some support for our conjecture
could be derived from the fact that Vanberg (2008) found no e¤ect of recipients’expectations
on the dictators’ decision to perform when there was no promissory link, while we clearly
identify a positive e¤ect on performance when such a direct promissory link exists.
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Figure 3a: Same as Figure 2 for empty talk Figure 3b: Same as Figure 2 for no message

The two panels of Figure 3 depict the same data as Figure 2 for those dictators who
changed their contribution decision between the two settings, but instead focuses on the
message categories of empty talk and no message. While there is a small change in behavior
towards more generous contribution rates from the unreliable to the reliable device for dictators who sent an empty talk message (Figure 3a), there is practically no change for dictators
who sent no message (Figure 3b). The slightly positive (but statistically insigni…cant) shift
in dictator contribution rates is larger for empty talk messages than for no messages. In
a related experiment that investigates commitment-based explanations of promise keeping
Ismayilov and Potters (2012) …nd that both trustees who make a promise and those who
do not are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the trustor. Their
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…ndings as well as ours suggest that any form of communication increases trustworthiness irrespective of the content of messages. This tentatively suggests that the guilt aversion e¤ect
is larger when there is some communication rather than none at all. However, as pointed
out above, in both cases, and in contrast to when the dictator made a promise, there is no
signi…cant di¤erence in the mean of the contribution decisions.
Finally, note that the highly statistical di¤erence in performance rates between the reliable and unreliable device for promises (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value < 0.01) and the lack
of statistical signi…cance for empty talk (p-value 0.27) and no message (p-value 0.14) are not
caused by large di¤erences in the number of individual observations (and hence statistical
power) across the three categories. As mentioned above, there are 383 (promise), 300 (empty
talk), and 268 (no message) individual observations, and 28, 27, and 28 matching group observations in the three message categories for both the reliable and the unreliable device. In
accordance with other previous contributions, we also …nd that average performance rates
are higher if the dictator made a promise (0.56) than if there was just empty talk (0.38) or no
message (0.38) (MW rank-sum, p-values < 0.01). This translates into a contribution di¤erence of $2.16 which is about 3 times as large as the $0.60 di¤erence in contributions between
the two random devices though that di¤erence is purely due to di¤erences to second-order
expectations. In contrast, the $2.16 di¤erence is a combination of several e¤ects. It contains
a selection e¤ect (subjects who promise are di¤erent from those who do not promise), the
commitment e¤ect (subjects feel compelled to contribute just because of the promise per
se) and the expectation e¤ect. Furthermore, in contrast to face-to-face interactions, between people who know each other well and may care strongly about not disappointing the
other party’s expectations, we would not expect the expectation e¤ect to be very large in
magnitude in our anonymous, low interaction experimental laboratory setting. However, we
show that even in this setting which is very similar to consumer-to-consumer eCommerce
transactions, expectations matter.

3.2

First-Order Beliefs and Expectations

Having documented evidence for the expectation-based explanation by analyzing the differences in contribution rates across treatments, we now investigate whether the secondary
predictions of our model regarding beliefs are also borne out in our data. Recipients were
asked to guess the dictator’s decision on a …ve-point scale between 0 and 1. When the
20

random device was reliable, the recipients had mean …rst-order beliefs

R(

; 5=6) of 0.23,

0.26, and 0.34 for no message, empty talk and promise, respectively. These beliefs were
slightly lower (0.22, 0.21, and 0.29) for the same messages in the case of an unreliable device,
R(

; 1=6). For both outcome realizations of the random device, receiving a promise (rela-

tive to receiving no message or empty talk) signi…cantly raised the recipients’expectations
about how much they would receive from the dictator, moving …rst-order expectations from
the lower values of 0.23 and 0.26 to 0.34 and from 0.22 and 0.21 to 0.29, respectively (MW
rank-sum, p-values 0.007, 0.005, 0.022, 0.006). This pattern mirrors the results of Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008) and is consistent with TP3 of our model.
However, although the …rst-order beliefs are lower across the board for the unreliable
device, the di¤erences in …rst-order beliefs between the two device settings are not statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values 0.17, 0.95, 0.45). Even when focusing on
the case in which the dictator sent a promise, the di¤erence in the recipient’s …rst-order
beliefs is not statistically signi…cant between a reliable and an unreliable device. The lack of
a statistically signi…cant di¤erence in …rst-order beliefs between the two reliability settings is
consistent with TP2 if the dictator did not promise (no message and empty talk). However,
it is inconsistent with the same theoretical prediction for the case where the dictator made
a promise, because the model predicts a di¤erence in …rst-order beliefs in that case.
It is important to remember that we elicited conditional beliefs that directly match
R(

; ) in our model and allow for easy comparability across the two reliability devices.

Recipients were asked how much (on a …ve-point scale) they thought the dictator would
contribute if performance was feasible, as the recipients did not actually learn whether performance was feasible for the dictator until after the end of each round. Therefore, the
relevant …rst-order expectations at the time the dictator forms her second-order expectations
and makes her performance decision are given by the unconditional …rst-order expectations,
which are 12

R(

) . Thus, in order to obtain the …rst-order expectations in terms of expected

payo¤s, the elicited conditional …rst-order beliefs have to be multiplied by 5=6
the reliable and by 1=6

12 = 10 for

12 = 2 for the unreliable device. We …nd that these unconditional

…rst-order beliefs are substantially higher in the reliable ($2.60, $2.30, and $3.40) than in
the unreliable scenario ($0.42, $0.44, and $0.58), and that these di¤erences are statistically
signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values < 0.01).30
30

This stark di¤erence is a (mechanical) feature of our experimental design. In contrast to previous
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3.3

Second-Order Beliefs and Expectations

We next investigate how second-order beliefs
the belief

R(

D(

; ) (i.e., a dictator’s belief

D(

; ) about

; ) that the recipient has about the dictator’s performance decision) vary with

the message sent by the dictator and the reliability of the random device. When the random
device was reliable, second-order beliefs were 0.59 when the dictator sent no message, 0.59 for
an empty talk message, and 0.72 when a promise was given. In contrast, when the random
device was unreliable, the same second-order beliefs fell to 0.48, 0.43, and 0.64, respectively.
The second-order beliefs in both reliability settings are signi…cantly higher for promises than
for empty talk and no messages (MW rank-sum, p-values < 0.01).
More importantly, though, given the focus of this paper, if the dictator made a promise
the di¤erence in second-order beliefs between the reliable and the unreliable random device
is statistically signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-value < 0.01) which is consistent with
TP2. That is to say, when a dictator made a promise to share money with the recipient, her
belief about the amount the recipient expected she would contribute was signi…cantly higher
when the random device was reliable (0.72) than when it was unreliable (0.64). The likely
reason for this …nding is the dictator’s realization that the recipient expected a higher level
of performance when the random device was reliable than when it was unreliable which led
the dictator to adapt her second-order beliefs accordingly.
When the dictator did not send any message or sent an empty talk message, secondorder beliefs were also signi…cantly higher in the 5/6 random device case than in the 1/6
random device condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p-values < 0.01). This contradicts TP2
which predicts that second-order beliefs should not di¤er between the two reliability settings
if the dictator did not make a promise. However, as shown in Section 3.1 and as predicted by
our main hypothesis TP1 contribution rates were not signi…cantly higher when expectations
were not supported by a promise.31
contributions, we do not vary second-order expectations through the endogenous variation of …rst-order
beliefs. Instead, we directly and exogenously change second-order expectations through the di¤erent random
device scenarios and the timing of when the dictator and the recipient learn about which random device was
chosen.
31
Dictators may have thought that even if they gave no promise recipients may hold higher (out-ofequilibrium) …rst-order expectations if the random device is reliable than if it is unreliable. Although
this contradicts TP2, this out-of-equilibrium phenomenon may lend additional support to our theory of
lexicographic promise keeping. Although the second-order beliefs are higher they do not translate into
higher contribution rates if there is no promise. In other words, di¤erences in second-order beliefs only
matter if they are justi…ed by a promise.
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The second-order expectations given by E [

Rj D ;

] = 12

D(

) that correspond to these

second-order beliefs in‡uence the level of guilt experienced by the dictator subjects as can be
seen from the utility function in equation (1). These second-order expectations are equal to
$5.88, $5.91, and $7.18 for the reliable device and signi…cantly lower (Wilcoxon signed-rank,
p-values < 0.01) for the unreliable device where they are equal to $0.96, $0.87, and $1.28.
This large di¤erence in second-order expectations is, of course, mainly exogenously (and
mechanically) created by the use of the random device and this large variation serves us in
our goal to separately identify the e¤ect of guilt aversion on promise keeping.

3.4

Promises and Opt-Out Decisions

Recipients chose to opt out at di¤erent rates depending on which message they received from
the dictator with whom they were paired. While only 7.3% of recipients chose to opt out
after receiving a message classi…ed as a promise, 21.6% opted out if they received no message
at all, and 12.8% opted out if they received an empty talk message. These di¤erential opt-out
rates are consistent with TP3, which predicts that the recipient’s (expected) payo¤ from
staying in the game is higher if the dictator sent a promise than if she did not.
The di¤erences in opt-out rates between recipients who received a promise and those who
received an empty talk message, and between empty talk messages and no messages are only
signi…cant at the 10% level (MW rank-sum, p-values 0.07, 0.07). In contrast, the di¤erence
in opt-out rates between participants who received a promise and those who did not receive
any message is signi…cant (MW rank-sum, p-value < 0.01). Similarly, the di¤erence between
participants who received a promise and (pooled) participants who did not receive a promise,
either because they received an empty talk message or no message at all, is signi…cant at the
1% level (MW rank-sum, p-value < 0.01). The low opt-out rate of recipients who received a
promise from their partnered dictator indicates that the recipients expected higher relative
payo¤s from staying in the game than from opting out compared to recipients who received
no message at all or just an empty talk message. Furthermore, the higher opt-out rate for
recipients who received no message relative to recipients of an empty talk message suggests
that some form of verbal engagement is better than none at all when it comes to inducing
recipients to stay in the game.32
32

This is in line with the aforementioned …ndings of Potters and Ismayilov (2012) who also …nd that even
some form of communication like empty talk increases trustworthiness.
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3.5

Distribution of

D

Using our simple model of guilt aversion as well the experimental data obtained on performance actions a, beliefs

R

and

D,

and message categories , we can directly recover

each dictator’s susceptibility to guilt aversion,

D.

However, because many dictators choose

strictly positive levels of performance a even when there is no promise ( = 0), we augment
our previous model by an additional term that captures altruism. The dictator’s utility
function is then given by
UD =

D

D

(a)

k

(max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

D

(a) ; 0g)k

r

where the dictator su¤ers a convex disutility if the receiver’s payo¤
maximum possible payo¤ of 12.33 If
D

D

(12
R

R

(a))r

(a) falls short of his

= 0, the dictator is not driven by altruism, but as

increases she cares more about the payo¤ obtained by the receiver. The values of k and

r in‡uence the convexity of the guilt aversion and the altruism terms, and are assumed to
be known by the dictator and the recipient. Using identifying variation for subjects who are
observed in the data choosing a under both a promise ( = 1) and no promise ( = 0), the
unknown altruism and guilt aversion parameters,

D

and

D,

are exactly identi…ed from the

…rst-order conditions with respect to a. To see this ignore, just for expositional purposes,
corner solutions and note that for

= 0 we have the following …rst-order condition for the

dictator’s choice of a:
@UD
=
@a
This allows us to obtain
@UD
=
@a
which using

D

4 + 12

yields

D.

D

4 + 12

D

(12

12a)r

Similarly, for

= 1 we have

(max f12

12a; 0g)k

D

1

1

= 0:

+ 12

D

(12

12a)r

1

=0

34
D.

The two panels of Figure 4 show the distribution of the altruism and guilt aversion
parameters in the dictator population for quadratic altruism, r = 2, and quadratic guilt
33

By using altruism we chose a very simple form of other-regarding preferences. This is because more
general speci…cations could potentially lead to higher-order beliefs also playing a role. For example, dictators
could be making contributions according to what is expected of them independent of their initial statement.
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In our experimental setting dictators are constrained to choose a 2 f0; :25; :5; :75; 1g. However, since we
also have several observations of a for each dictator we use dictator-speci…c averages of a for given and
when solving the …rst-order conditions for D and D . We take corner solutions at a = f0; 1g into account.
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aversion, k = 2.35 Given our assumptions, we are only able to identify the distribution of
for 104 dictators who are observed under both

D

= f0; ;g and

= 1. As suggested by

our reduced form analysis that documents a signi…cant positive shift in performance from
unreliable to reliable device when

= 1, the distribution of

than half of the dictators exhibit guilt aversion,

D

D

(Figure 4b) shows that more

> 0, while the remaining, slightly smaller

proportion of just under 50% is una¤ected by this behavioral trait,

= 0.
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Figure 4a: Altruism parameter
r=k=2

The dictators with a positive

D

D

for

15

Figure 4b: Guilt aversion parameter
r=k=2

20

D

for

fall into two broad categories as can be seen from Figure

4b. First, there is a mass of about 25% of all dictators (at

D

20) where

in equilibrium the dictators raise a su¢ ciently high such that a

D.

D

is so large that

In this way, they

reduce their own monetary payo¤ in order to completely avoid any loss from guilt aversion
which they would otherwise su¤er if they chose a lower performance a. Of course, the true
D

of these dictators might be even higher than 20, but these subjects are already at a corner

solution in our data. Second, for roughly 25% of dictators,

D

lies between the two mass

points of 0 and 20, and so these dictators trade o¤ some monetary gains against losses from
guilt aversion. They do not, however, raise a high enough to completely eliminate guilt in
equilibrium.
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Note that while convexity in the guilt aversion term (i.e., k > 1) is required to explain any subject
choices that are not corner solutions, we chose these particular parameters for their simplicity and their …t
with our data. Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we used di¤erent parameters.
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4

Conclusions

Many psychological and economic experiments have shown that promises greatly enhance
cooperative behavior in experimental games, but evidence on the driving forces behind why
people keep their promises remains scant. In this paper we provided the …rst clean evidence
for the expectation-based explanation of promise keeping.
Previous experiments either could not distinguish between commitment-based and expectationbased explanations, because treatment-induced changes in the alternative causal factors
(promises and second-order beliefs) had occurred simultaneously, or focus on settings in
which there was an insu¢ cient level of commitment between the dictator and the recipient
for the changes in the levels of (…rst- and second-order) expectations to a¤ect behavior.
In contrast, we designed our experiment to achieve independent variation in secondorder expectations in an environment where these were supported by a direct promissory
link between the dictator and the recipient, and thus by the existence of a su¢ ciently high
level of commitment. Changes in the probability with which a dictator would be able to
contribute directly impacted recipients’…rst-order and dictators’second-order expectations,
which in turn signi…cantly changed behavior. In light of our own as well as previous …ndings,
we propose a lexicographic theory of promise keeping. Guilt and expectations matter if and
only if they are supported by the promise between the two acting parties.
Strictly speaking, Vanberg (2008) shows two things: First, he demonstrates that expectations per se, that is, expectations unsupported by a direct promise, do not explain promise
keeping. In other words, he shows that without a direct promise expectations are insu¢ cient
to induce cooperation. Second, he shows that promises have a positive e¤ect on cooperation when there are positive expectations. The present paper shows that expectations have
a positive e¤ect on cooperation if there is a promise. However, evidence that promising
per se is su¢ cient to induce cooperation is so far missing. To see this, imagine that the
only motivation for keeping a promise is that the promisor does not want to disappoint the
promisee’s expectations. Further assume that, consistent with our lexicographic theory, the
sensitivity to the recipient’s expectations is only switched on by a promise. Then, under the
expectation-based theory, we would predict that a dictator who has made a promise is more
likely to perform than a dictator who has not made a promise simply because her sensitivity
to expectations will only be switched on if she made a promise. Note that for this to hap26

pen we need not assume any independent preference for promise keeping. The whole e¤ect
could work exclusively through the desire not to disappoint expectations so long as they
are supported by a promise. In order to show that there is an independent preference for
promise keeping we would have to design an experiment that varies the dictator’s promissory
commitment while keeping the recipient’s expectations at zero. This would be an interesting
avenue for future research.
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A

Instructions

Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study
how people make decisions in a particular situation. In case you should have questions at
any time, please raise your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the
experiment. You will receive $10 for arriving on time. Depending on the decisions made
and the decisions of other participants, you may receive an additional amount (as described
below). At the end of the experiment, the entire amount will be paid to you individually
and privately in cash.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds and 8 paying rounds with money prizes. In each
round, you will interact with another randomly chosen participant. Under no circumstances
will you interact with the same participant twice. No participant will learn the identity of
the persons with whom he or she has interacted during the experiment.
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At the end of the experiment, one of the 8 paying rounds will be randomly chosen for
payment (every round is equally likely). The amount that you will receive at the end of the
experiment will depend on the decisions made in that round.
Each round consists of 7 steps, which are described below.
Overview
There are two players; Player A and Player B. Initially, A can send a chat message to
B over the computer, and B can decide whether he wants to opt out of the game, leading
to payo¤s of $2 for each player. If B does not opt out, a random device will determine
whether it will be possible for A to perform, that is, allocate money to B. If it is impossible
to perform, Player A gets a payo¤ of $14 and B gets a payo¤ of 0. If it is possible for A to
perform, he can make one of 5 choices:
Don’t Perform: A keeps $14 for himself and allocates $0 to B.
1/4 Perform: A keeps $13 for himself and allocates $3 to B.
1/2 Perform: A keeps $12 for himself and allocates $6 to B.
3/4 Perform: A keeps $11 for himself and allocates $9 to B.
Perform: A keeps $10 for himself and allocates $12 to B.
There are two types of Random Device
Random Device 5/6: A is able to choose something other than Don’t Perform with
probability 5/6.
Random Device 1/6: A is able to choose something other than Don’t Perform with
probability 1/6.
The players learn about the type of the random device after B has made his opt-out
decision.
Step 1: Role assignment. At the beginning of each round, you will be anonymously
and randomly matched with another participant. Each member of the pair will then be
randomly assigned Role A or Role B with equal probability (50%).
Step 2: Communication. During the communication phase, Player A can send a chat
message to Player B. Important: You are not allowed to reveal your identity to the other
participant. (That is, you may not reveal your name or any other identifying feature such
as race, gender, hair color, or seat number.) In every other respect, you are free to send
any message you like. Please continue to remain quiet while communicating with the other
participant. Participants who violate these rules (experimenter discretion) will be excluded
from the experiment and all payments.
Step 3: Opt-out decision. Player B can decide whether to opt out. If B chooses to opt
out, each player receives $2. If B chooses not to opt out, the game continues. Information:
Neither player knows, whether the Random Device determining if A will be able to choose
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Perform is Random Device 5/6 (probability that A can choose something other than Don’t
Perform is 5/6) or Random Device 1/6 (probability that A can choose something other than
Don’t Perform is 1/6). However, both parties know that each scenario occurs with equal
probability (50%).
Step 4: Nature of the Random Device revealed. The players learn whether they
play with Random Device 5/6 or Random Device 1/6.
Step 5: Guessing. Player B guesses which choice Player A is likely to make in Step 7.
A guesses which payo¤ B expects to gain. Note that if B thinks that A intends to choose
Perform— allocating $12— B’s expected payo¤ depends on what B has learned about the
Random Device: The expected payo¤ is $2 if the game is played with Random Device 1/6
(12 1=6 = 2) and $10 if the game is played with Random Device 5/6 (12 5=6 = 10).
Step 6: Player A learns whether he will be able to perform. If only Don’t Perform is
possible, the game ends. If A is able to perform, the game continues to Step 7.
Step 7: Decision phase. A decides whether to choose Don’t Perform (keep $14 and
send $0 to B), or whether to choose Perform (keep $10 and send $12 to B) or any of the
options in between. The payo¤s are

A chooses Don’t Perform
A chooses 1/4 Perform
A chooses 1/2 Perform
A chooses 3/4 Perform
A chooses Perform
B chooses “Opt Out”
Performance not possible

A
B
$14 $0
$13 $3
$12 $6
$11 $9
$10 $12
$2 $2
$14 0

Information at the end of a round. Players learn their own payo¤, which random
device was chosen, and the players learn whether player A was able to perform.
Conditional Choice. You will be asked to make the guess in Step 5 and the decision in
Step 7 before Step 4 has actually been played. In other words, you will be asked to assume
that A will be able to perform in Step 7, and then make the guess in Step 5 and the decision
in Step 7 for two scenarios:
1. Random device 1/6 was chosen.
2. Random device 5/6 was chosen.
Subsequently, Steps 4 and 6 are played and A’s recorded choice will be entered as A’s
decision in Step 7 (provided the game reaches this step). A’s decision will in‡uence payo¤s
as if A took the same decision in Step 7.
Bonus: Guessing. At certain points, you will have the additional possibility to earn
a small amount by guessing the decisions of the other participant. Guessing will be paid in
every round that is not chosen for payment of the decision. You will learn more about this
during the experiment.
Do you have any questions?
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B

Proofs

We use Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2007) general model of simple guilt to capture guilt
aversion in our model. Applying their formulation to our game and notation yields the
following utility function for the dictator
UD =

D (a)

D

max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

(a) ; 0g :

To this formulation we add the lexicographic structure of promise keeping which is governed
by in our model, and we allow for convex guilt to obtain
UD =

D

(a)

D

k

(max fE [

Rj D ;

]

R

(a) ; 0g)k

We will …rst prove TP1 by showing that the dictator’s equilibrium choice a after having
given a promise is strictly increasing in for su¢ ciently high guilt aversion and 0 otherwise.
The prediction for = 0 follows trivially from the dictator’s utility function in expression
(2). We distinguish two cases, k = 1 and k > 1.
Case k = 1: If k = 1, U (a) is a linear function in a and U 0 (a) = 4+12 D . It follows that
the equilibrium action a maximizing the dictator’s utility is given by the following corner
solutions:
0
if D 13
a =
(4)
1
D if D > 3 :
TP1 for k = 1 follows directly from (4).
Case k > 1: If k > 1, note that U 0 (a) = 4 < 0 on the interval [ D ; 1). Therefore, the
only candidate a
^1 for a maximizer of the dictator’s utility function on the interval [ D ; 1)
is the corner solution D , which is increasing in and D .
On the interval [0; D ), note that the dictator’s utility function is strictly concave as
00
U (a) = 12k (k 1) D ( D a)k 2 < 0 for all a 2 [0; D ). First, assume that U 0 (0) 0.
Then, it follows from the concavity of the dictator’s utility function that the a
^2 maximizing
the dictator’s utility function on the interval [0; D ) is a
^2 = 0, which is independent of .
Second, assume that U 00 (0) > 0, which happens for su¢ ciently high guilt aversion, i.e.,
D

4

>

12k (

Then, assuming a maximizer a
^3 exists on [0;
the following …rst-order condition:
a
^3 =
It can be seen that a
^3 increases in , in

D ),

k 1

and
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:

it must be an interior solution given by

4
k
D 12

D

D,

D)

D,

1
k 1

:
which proves TP1.

Beliefs and Second-order E¤ects on Performance So far we have implicitly assumed
that the dictator’s second-order beliefs are constant at D . However, as the dictator’s equilibrium choice a weakly increases in , …rst- and second-order beliefs must adjust accordingly.
Hence, R and D must be weakly increasing in . This yields TP2.
As the dictator’s equilibrium action is increasing in D , this adjustment of beliefs leads
to a (second-order) e¤ect reinforcing TP1.
Opt-out Decision A (risk-neutral) recipient will opt in if
E[

R]

= 12E [

R

( )] > 2:

If = 0, the dictator will choose a = 0 and the recipient’s beliefs will adjust accordingly.
Hence, R ( ) and therefore also E [ R ] = E [ R ( )] will be higher for = 1 than for = 0.
As a result, opt-out rates are lower for = 1 than for = 0. This yields TP3.
Example: Assume that R ( ) = 0 for = 0, and R ( ) = 1 for = 1. Then we would
1=6
have 0 > 2 for = 0 and 12 1=2
= 6 > 2 for = 1:
1=2 5=6
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